the fourth year of war

Today begins America’s fourth year of war in Iraq and many Americans are beginning to wonder why we are still there. Saddam Hussein was easily overthrown in 2003, but we have found that making peace is much more difficult than making war. In essence, we are now fighting a new war, and the positions that Americans staked out before the invasion (anti-war or pro-war) no longer seem to make sense. The damage has been done. We’ve destroyed a nation’s government and infrastructure and exposed deep ethnic divisions in their country. Now what do we owe them? How do we make sense of our military involvement there? The Bush administration seems to argue that our goal is now to stay in Iraq until the insurgency is defeated and Iraq has a stable, unified government. Anti-war advocates call for an immediate troop withdrawal from Iraq as the only moral response to the situation. But are these the only options? A look at Catholic just war theory provides some answers, and perhaps some directions for the anti-war movement in this fourth year of the conflict.

At this blog we’ve taken the position from the beginning that the invasion was wrong. The age-old Catholic theory of just war, which provides a reasonable, thoughtful framework for analyzing the “rightness” of any proposed military action, makes this clear. Just war theory begins with the presumption that war is always a moral failure for humanity, and those who would advocate war must bear the burden of proof for its use. The just war theory is built on seven pre-requisites: just cause, competent authority, comparative justice, right intention, last resort, probability of success and proportionality. In all but perhaps one of these categories (competent authority?) the war in Iraq did not meet muster. Granted, it is easy to say this in hindsight, but many thoughtful people, including the U.S. Catholic bishops, found plenty of evidence in 2003 that invading Iraq at that time was not just.

Nevertheless, the invasion took place. Saddam Hussein was toppled, and now American troops find themselves in a different war. The original “enemy” (Saddam’s regime) is now gone, and we find ourselves in the position of national police force for Iraq, trying to provide security and stability while a handful of Iraqis try to build a new, multi-ethnic, democratic government. And we find ourselves fighting a new enemy: insurgent terrorists who either a) see Iraq as a good place to wage jihadist war against Westerners who have conveniently placed themselves in a vulnerable position, or b) want to disrupt Iraqi civil society to secure positions of power in post-war Iraq, or both. The latter people would probably be Sunnis who long for the days when their ethnic group dominated the nation’s wealth and power under Saddam.

So, we are in a different war, albeit one we are responsible for starting. How should we proceed? Our moral culpability in creating this situation increases our burden of responsibility toward the Iraqi people. Is it more just to maintain our military occupation of Iraq, at least for now, or to pull our troops out and wash our hands of the situation? And what are the other options? If we analyze this new war according to the principles of just war theory, what conclusions might emerge? Let’s consider each principle of just war theory as it applies to the new situation.

1. Just cause: The only just cause according to just war theory is to confront a real and certain danger to human life. In this case, the cause could be stated as maintaining civil order while the new Iraqi government is established and destroying the insurgency movement that provides the biggest threat to that order. On this count, there does seem to be some justification for our continued military presence. The insurgency does seem to be bent on destroying the social fabric of the country. However, a serious consideration should be that the insurgents are responding more to the U.S. occupation than to any possible government that might emerge. In this sense, our presence fuels the insurgency itself, and complicates the “justness” of our cause.

2. Competent authority: This principle states that only the legitimate authority of a country can declare war (as opposed to say, the state of Kentucky declaring war on Iraq). We might argue over the competence and the legitimacy of the Bush administration, but such a debate would not advance the analysis of whether our occupation of Iraq is now “just.” We have to accept that Bush is president of the United States and Congress has given him authority to maintain troops in Iraq. The deeper question here is “Who is the legitimate authority in Iraq?” If we are going to respect the sovereignty of nations—including those recently conquered—we have to view the new Iraqi government as the legal authority in that country, even if it is weak and unstable. It would appear that Iraq’s leaders recognize that U.S. troops are needed to provide security for the country for the time being, but would like to see a troop pullout as quickly as possible. So, we can conclude that for the war to be just, we must anticipate and plan for a troop withdrawal in the near future in accordance with Iraqi wishes.

3. Comparative justice: This principle demands that we ask ourselves which “side” is sufficiently “right” in the dispute, and are the values at stake critical enough to override the presumption against war? The presumption against war would suggest an immediate pullout of U.S. troops. Are the values at stake in Iraq critical enough to indicate that American forces remain, at least for the time being? The values at stake appear to be whether Iraq will be a peaceful democracy or….what? This is difficult to assess because it is not clear what political alternative the insurgents would prefer: an Islamic theocracy (would that be Sunni or Shiite? The Kurds won’t accept this either way)? A Sunni dictatorship like that of Sadaam Hussein’s? A divided Iraq, with three separate governments (Sunni, Shiite and Kurd)? Perhaps the insurgents don’t care: perhaps they fight for the sake of fighting infidels who have invaded a Muslim country? At the risk of being called ethnocentric by my liberal friends, I would argue that an Iraqi democracy is objectively superior to a dictatorship or theocracy, but who is to say that a three-state solution might not be as acceptable as a unified Iraq?

If American troops pull out, what will be the result? The civil war that is already underway in Iraq will likely intensify. What would be the likely outcome of an all-out civil war? Perhaps the ethnic groups will fight their way into the three-state solution anyway? Or perhaps they will engage in genocidal blood-letting in an attempt to dominate all of Iraq. It is hard to imagine the United State simply walking away from this mess and letting the country be washed in blood; even if we continue our occupation and the ultimate solution is three independent nations, do we not owe it to the Iraqis to try to help them arrive at this conclusion peacefully? This principle of just war would indicate that we do indeed have an obligation to the Iraqi people and their future security.

4. Right intention: This is perhaps the trickiest just war condition as applied to Iraq. This principle dictates that war can only be legitimate if its intention is genuinely rooted in the just cause outlined above in principle number 1. If the U.S. leadership has any other intention, such as maintaining a permanent military presence in the Middle East, or enriching American business interests, or securing easy access to oil products, then this principal has been violated. The problem is that we have no way of knowing the actual intentions of the U.S. administration, and given its proclivity to engage in misinformation and distortion of the facts, neither Americans nor Iraqis have reason to trust the President’s intentions. The only way to mitigate this issue somewhat would be if the U.S. would, as a matter of policy, formally resolve that it will maintain no military bases in Iraq after the resolution of conflict, and if it would propose a specific timetable for troop withdrawal that parallels a timetable for the new Iraqi government taking charge of its own security.

5. Last resort: for a war to be justified, violence must be engaged as a last resort. Again, it is difficult to assess the current conflict in this light. Could the U.S. leadership engage in more aggressive diplomacy to resolve the conflict, especially by actively soliciting the input and involvement of the international community? Perhaps, but it is unlikely that this would make much difference for the jihadist forces who seem to be leading the insurgency and who seem bent on fighting until every American is gone from Iraq. At any rate, an immediate troop pullout would not likely advance the conditions of diplomacy: but a specific, if flexible, timetable for withdrawal might.

6. Probability of success: For a war to be just, there has to be a reasonable chance that the just goals of the war can be achieved. Heroic but suicidal stands are not acceptable by just war standards. Human life is too precious to be wasted on a cause that has no hope of success. This principle is a key factor in why the invasion of Iraq was not justified in the first place. While toppling Saddam Hussein was assured, the probability of creating a post-war Iraq that was more stable, peaceful and just than Saddam’s regime was slim. What is the probability of bringing peace and democracy to Iraq now that this new war is underway? This is a very arguable topic, but realistically, Iraq has no historical or philosophical reference point for pluralistic democracy. A unified, democratic Iraq is a long-shot no matter how long U.S. troops remain. And it is possible that Iraqis might freely choose some form of government that is antithetical to American political values and traditions.

7. Proportionality: According to just war theory, this means that “the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up [in this case maintaining] arms.” Again, this is where the original invasion failed, but now we are weighing the costs of maintaining troops in Iraq, even if temporarily, against the costs of immediate pullout. Would it be worth the continued loss of American lives if Iraq could eventually become a stable, democratic country? Perhaps, but if the probability of success is as slim as it appears to be under principle 6 above, then the answer may be “no.”

Of course, the just war theory is not meant to be used as a scorecard. It is impossible to say that each principle of just war is equal to the others and that you could just add up the points and make a determination about a war’s legitimacy. All factors must be thoughtfully considered. Based on this analysis, I believe that we are in a paradoxical situation: an American military presence in Iraq may be justified at this point, but only temporarily if it is genuinely a component of bringing peace, security and autonomy to the nation. So, far this is congruent with current American policy. However, it should also be clear that the best strategy for bringing peace and security to Iraq is to get American troops out of the country as soon as possible.

This is a complicated and nuanced position, but essentially I believe the American people should try to articulate the following demands of the U.S. government:

1. That the U.S. Congress adopt a resolution stating it is the policy of the United States that no permanent American military bases will ever be established in Iraq.
2. That Congress demand that the President provide a specific timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq that will parallel steps taken by the Iraqi police and military to take control of their own security. This plan should be specific but flexible, recognizing that American troop pullout will work in tandem with Iraqi stability. The clear commitment to pullout will deprive the insurgency of its rationale for existence and return the political debate in Iraq back to the structure of its new government.
3. The international community should be actively invited to participate in aggressive diplomacy with the factions of the new Iraqi government to work out a constitutional agreement that will satisfy all parties. If such an agreement cannot be developed, then the concept of a divided, three-state Iraq should be included in the negotiations.
4. Congress should make all future funding for the war effort contingent upon the President’s compliance with the stipulations just described.

How does this change the current debate over the war? Until the President and Congress are willing to take these steps, probably not much. The anti-war movement still has a lot of work to do, and their message can remain, in essence: “Bring home the troops!” But we should also be willing to offer some specific ideas for transition so that Iraq has a decent shot at democracy. Such a transition plan would have broad appeal for Americans who want to see the new Iraq succeed, but who are ready to acknowledge the flaws of the invasion and who are especially ready to see their beloved troops back home with their families.